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I Introduction
In an earlier essay (Oudiz and Sachs, 1984) we investigated the quantitative
gains to international policy coordination in a static environment. In this
paper, we begin to extend the analysis to a dynamic setting. However,
because of several new issues, this first step is more
theoretical than empirical. The extension to dynamics introduces three
important points of realism to the static game. First, the payoffs to
beggar-thy-neighbor policies may look very different in one-period and
multiperiod games, so that the need for policy coordination may be
different in the two games. Second, it is often claimed that governments
are shortsighted in macroeconomic planning, and support for this view has
come from the literature on political business cycles.' We should therefore
investigate whether international policy coordination is likely to exacerbate
or meliorate this shortsighted behavior. Third, governments act under a
fundamental constraint that they cannot bind the actions of later govern-
ments (or even of themselves at a future date). In principle, therefore,
optimizing governments must take into account how future governments
will behave in view of the economic environment that they inherit. We
study the implications for policy coordination of this inability to bind
future governments.
Let us consider these three points in turn. In the static game, uncoordi-
nated macroeconomic policy-making is typically inefficient because of a
prisoner's dilemma in policy choices. Consider, for example, two countries
that are attempting to move optimally along short-run Phillips curves, It
may be that each country will choose contractionary policies no matter
what the other country selects, though the policy pair (expand, expand)
is better for both countries than the non-cooperative equilibrium (contract,
contract). As we showed in our earlier study, this situation arises naturally



















wiInternational coordination in dynamic macroeconomics 275
is expanding a country can appreciate its currency and export some of its
inflation abroad. It is this beggar-thy-neighbor action that gives rise to the
prisoner's dilemma. Cooperation, say in the form of a binding international
commitment to expand, may be useful in moving the countries to the
efficient equilibrium.
The question arises whether the payoff structure in a multiperiod, or
infinite-horizon, game will look the same. The reason for doubt is simple.
In almost all macroeconomic models, policies which lead to a short-run
real appreciation also lead to long-run real depreciation, or at least a return
to the initial real exchange rate. In this circumstance, farsighted players
understand that a short-run beggar-thy-neighbor appreciation is
less attractive than it looks, since it will be reversed in the long run, at which
point the country reimports the inflation that it earlier sent abroad. To this
extent, the beggar-thy-neighbor policy loses its appeal, and the need for
coordination is reduced.
The second theme introduced in a multiperiod setting is the myopic
r, behavior of governments. In considering public welfare in a multiperiod




Here, isthe intertemporal utility of country iasof time zero. is
ts the instantaneous utility of the country at time t,asfunction of a vector
of macroeconomic targets T./1is a pure rate of time preference, with/i <1,
re so that the future is discounted relative to the present. The planning
te interval is for tbetween0 and T.
a In view of the evidence on political business cycles, in which governments
attempt to manipulate inconjunction with upcoming elections, it seems
e, natural to suggest that if (1) is the 'true' social welfare function, the
government's social welfare function take the form:
e
d =E/jGtu(Ti) (2)
where TGTand</1. That is, its planning horizon is shorter than the
a economy's, or its discounting of the future is higher.
In this view, the public is partly a hostage of a self-serving government.
It The policy choices reflect the incumbent government's goals, and not the
public's. If this is so, we can ask whether international policy coordination
I) is likely to improve or worsen this sub-optimal situation. At an abstract
level, the arguments seem to fall on both sides. Some critics, for example,
have characterized policy coordination as a cartel of the incumbents, in
y which each policymaker helps the others to manipulate the political
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business cycle. As an example of this, policymakers may have a short-run
expansionary bias if expansion shows up as output today and as inflation
only many years in the future. To some extent, the fear of currency
depreciation following a unilateral expansion keeps this bias in check.
That is, the flexible exchange rate provides discipline on the shortsighted g
government. With policy coordination, the fear of currency depreciation
can be removed by a commitment of all countries to expand. In this way, r
policy coordination may give incumbent governments a free hand to
undertake overly inflationary policies. I
Onthe other hand, we can think of circumstances in which policy
coordination ties the hand of incumbents, and thus prevents such self-
serving policies. An international gold standard, for example, might g
impose discipline on governments that would not exist in each country
alone. To analyse this possibility fully we would have to examine each ti
government's incentive to stick with a particular rule, and the extent to a
which internationally certified rules are more or less durable than rules ti
undertaken unilaterally. For example, each country on its own could adopt e:
a gold standard. What, if anything,is added by a multicouñtry e:
commitment?
The third theme introduced in a multiperiod setting is that of 'time-
consistency' of optimal plans. Even in circumstances in which the current d
government (or current administration) has the public's interest at heart, a
its ability to maximize social welfare may be limited by its inability to s
pre-committhe actions of (well-meaning) future governments. In these
circumstances, the current government must choose its optimal policy S
taking as given the policy rules that will be pursued in the future. That is,
it must optimize today, assuming that future governments will optimize F
under the assumption that yet future governments will optimize, and so
on. In general this constrained optimization yields a lower level of social
welfare than does the case in which the government can choose not only I
its own policies but those of future governments as well.
Many authors, including Barro and Gordon (1983) and Rogoff (1983),
have given examples in which the inability to bind future policies imparts cd
an inflationary bias to the economy. In these examples, wage setters set
wages before macroeconomic policy isset. Once the wages are set,
policymakers have an incentive to expand the economy to reduce real
wages, and raise output. Wage setters anticipate these policies, and choose
inflationary wage settlements in anticipation. If the government can ti
pre-commit to avoid inflationary policies, the economy can get the same g
ex post output levels at a lower rate of inflation. Unfortunately, such a
pre-commitment is not credible since the government has an incentive to
renege on it after the wages are set. H
As Rogoff stresses, this time consistency problem may have important
l
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consequencesfor international policy coordination. If the inability to bind
)fl futurepoliciesleadstoan inflationarybias,internationalpolicy
coordination may further exacerbate this bias by eliminating each country's
:k. concern about currency depreciation. Thus, even when a sequence of
ed governments within each country is trying to maximize that country's true
social welfare function, policy coordination may make the situation worse
rather than better.
to We consider later on several factors that tend to weaken this pessimistic
conclusion. First, in infinite-horizon games, governments may be able to
icy invest in a 'reputation' in order to overcome the time-inconsistency
problem (as illustrated in Barro and Gordon (1983)). In other words, a
government's credibility may be judged by its willingness to honor a
•try program laid down by an earlier government, so much that it continues
•ich the policy rather than reoptimizing during its incumbency. We will provide
to an example of this solution to the time inconsistency problem. Second, to
.les the extent that the time inconsistency problem revolves around the
•)pt exchange rate, policy coordination may actually eliminate the problem. In
try examples laterinthe paper, optimal coordinated policiesinour
two-country model turn out to be time-consistent.
The plan of the paper is as follows. In the next section we set out a simple
dynamic macroeconomic model characterized by flexible exchange rates
it, and perfect foresight on the part of the private and public sectors. In
to Section III, we describe various equilibria in a one-country version of the
ese model, to highlight the implications of time inconsistency. Next, in
icy Section IV, we describe the various equilibria in the two-country version of
is, the game, including the welfare gains or losses from policy coordination.
ize Extensions and conclusions are discussed in a final section.
II A simple dynamic macroeconomic model
We consider a simple model of the sort explored by Dornbusch (1976).
3), The home country produces output Q,atprice P, and trades with a foreign
rts country, which produces Q*atpriceThe domestic exchange rate E
set measures units of home currency per unit of foreign currency, so that the
relative price of the home good is P/(EP*). Demand for the home good
eal is a decreasing function of P/(EP*) and of the real interest rate, and an
)se increasing function of Q*.Lettinglower case variablesp, q, and erepresent
an the logarithms of their upper-case counterparts, we write demand for home
rue goods as:
to = (3)
Here, i is the nominal interest rate, and— —ps) the home real interest
ant rate at time t is the expectation ofat time t). Under the perfect278 Gilles Oudiz and Jeffrey Sachs
foresight assumption, which we hereafter maintain, = for Jr
ec
The money demand equations take the standard transactions form: at
= (4) at
01
For convenience, we will invert this equation and write
= (5)
with=and p =1/c.Following Dornbusch, we assume perfect 01
capital mobility, so that uncovered interest arbitrage holds:,
—=— (6)
Again, assuming perfect foresight, we solve for equilibria with=
for all t.
It remains to specify wage and price dynamics. First, the (log) consumer
price index (pC)iswritten as a weighted average of home (p) and foreign
(p*+e) prices
=Apt+(l__A)(pt*+et) (7)
Home prices are written as a fixed markup over wages: cd
(8)
Finally, nominal wage change, —wt,is made a function of lagged
consumer price change, output, and output change: o
= (9)
Note that since Wt+i—is a function of lagged rather than contempor-
aneous price change, the system will display typical Keynesian features, u
particularly the ofwith respect to contemporaneous and d
future anticipated changes inThis is the standard presumption in the T
Dornbusch model that the labor market clears more slowly than the asset
markets.
In the next section, we will introduce corresponding equations for the
second country, in order to construct a two-country model. Here, we focus Nt
on the one-country case by making the small-country assumption for the
home economy that and q* are given for all t0. By doing so, we
can write the one-country model as a four-dimensional difference equation





* itInternational coordination in dynamic macroeconomics 279
Inany given period, pj, and are given by the past history of the
economy. These are the 'pre-determined' variables of the economy, me,
and indeed the entire sequence of m, is chosen as a policy variable. p', i',
and q' are exogenous forcing variables of the system from the point of view
I) of the home economy.
As is typical of perfect foresight models, an asset price such asis
determined not by past history but by forward-looking behavior of asset
5) holders. In particular, for given values of and given sequences
of1*, and q* from t to infinity, there is typically a unique value of
such that the exchange rate does not grow or collapse explosively
(technically, this unique value of et puts the economy on its stable
5) manifold). Such a unique value of eg exists as long as the eigenvalue
associatedwithin the A matrix is outside the unit circle, and the
remaining eigenvalues are on or within the unit circle. In the simulations
reported below, this condition is always satisfied.
The goal of economic policy in our model will be to maximize a social
• welfare function as in (1) or (2), subject to the constraint in (10). The
assumption that egis always such as to keep the economy on the
7) saddlepoint path (or stable manifold) requires that economic agents have
complete knowledge as to the path of future policies. In this sense, the
government is like a Stackelberg leader with respect to the private sector,
choosing monetary policy with a view to affectingand thereby more basic
economic targets, whileis chosen taking as given the future sequence
of m. This is not to say, however, that governments can necessarily choose
any sequence of en that they desire. A large part of the discussion that
follows describes the 'admissible' sequences of policies.
As a concrete example of this model, we will suppose that instantaneous
s, utility is a quadratic function of inflation,= and the




Notethat çb is a parameter reflecting the weight attached torelativeto
fiisthe discount factor. We have written the utility function with an
'e infinite horizon, and we will point out shortly some special features of the
n problem that arise with such a formulation.
We now turn to the optimal policy for en. It may seem straightforward
to maximize (11) subject to (10), but as Phelps and Pollak (1968) first
explained, and Kydland and Prescott (1977) further elucidated, the
maximization is quite problematic. Here we sketch the problem, and treat
it in greater detail below.
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Suppose that we apply optimal control techniques to the problem of
maximizing U0 subject to (10), taking as given p0, pC_t, q_1. For simplicity,
we set===0for all t0. The result of this straightforward
control problem will be an infinite sequence m0,m1,. .., denotedhereafter
thatmaximizes U0. Let us write this optimal choice of monetary
policy as We have already noted that e0 will in general be a function
of p0, q_1 and the entire sequence The first step of this sequence
tsth0.
r
Giventh0, e0, p0, and q_1, we can use (10) to findp0, q0. Suppose
now that at time 1 the policymakers reoptimize, in order to maximize U1
subject to (10). Once again, a simple control problem will yield a sequence r
m1, m2, ...,nowdenoted as {th}r. In general,will not equal t 1,
so that the government at time 1 will not want to carry on with the optimal
plan as of time zero. If the government at time 1 is not bound (e.g. by a
constitution) to carry out t
As Kydland and Prescott stressed, we cannot simply assume away this
problem by letting the initial government choose th0, the next choose th1,
etc.; i.e. by letting each succeeding government optimize anew, using the
optimal control solution (this is close to what Buiter (1983) and Miller and
Salmon (1983) propose, incorrectly we believe, as discussed below). The
problem is much deeper, for the following reason. The choice th0 is optimal
only under the assumption that it is followed by th1, th2 It has no
particular attractiveness given that it will be followed by th1 and other
me #for t2. Moreover, the exchange rate e0 will be a function not of
{th0}, as the original government's solution assumed, but rather of the
actualthat will be selected.
Phelps and Pollak, and Kydland and Prescott, provided the answer to
this difficulty. Unless the original government can act to bind all future
governments, it must optimize with the full knowledge that all future e
governments will be free to optimize. A time consistent equilibrium is one
in which each government optimizes its policy choice taking as given the
policy rules (or specific policy actions) that future governments will use.
With a finite time such an optimization is easy to carry out. Let
XT represent the inherited state of the economy in the final period T. In
our example XT would be the vector <PT' qr-i>. Given XT, it is easy
to find the best policy mT =fT(xT) that maximizes At time a:
T— 1, the penultimate government knows that its successor will follow
mr =fT(xT). It is then an easy task to maximize EtTC subject to
(10) and the constraint mT =fT(xT). This second optimization will yield a
the rule mT_l =fT_l(xt_l). By backward recursion, every government
could thereby find a policy rule that is optimal given the rule that t
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of succeedingadministrationswill follow. Such rules will be credible to the
ity, private sector (e.g. the asset holders in the foreign exchange market)
ard because each government is doing the best that it can given the freedom
rter of action of future governments.
ary in an infinite-horizon setting, the solution of the time-consistency issue
ion is a bit more complex, as we shall soon see. The problem is that there is
nce likely to be a multiplicity,perhapsan infinity, of policy rules that have the
• property that they are optimal given that future governments will also
•ose choose the rule. There is an embarrassing abundance of time-consistent
U, policies.Not only is it hard to find all of these solutions, but it is not
nce necessarily straightforward to choose among them.
1, In summary, there are typically two types of equilibria in multiperiod
nal planning problems. The first type assumes that the initialgovernment can
• a pre-commit to an entire sequence of moves, or to a policy rule. For this
type of problem, optimal control suffices. The second types of problem
this more realistically assumes that each government can make its 'move,' but
•the, cannot bind the hand of future governments. It must therefore optimize,
the taking as given the freedom of choice of future governments. Before
md proceeding to the multicountry setting, it is useful to study some more
[he technical aspects of these two approaches.
iial
no Pre-commitment equilibria
her There are two types of pre-commitment equilibria. In the first, the
of government selects an entire sequence that by assumption will be
the carried out at all future dates. In the second, the initial government selects
a = .
..) thatis also assumed to bind all future governments.
to The first equilibrium is termed an open-loop solution, and the second, a
ure closed-loop solution. Both solutions will tend to be time-inconsistent,
ure except in special cases, in the sense that future governments will want to
deviate from the original sequence (in the open-loop case), or the original
the rule (in the closed-loop case), even if they believe that other governments
se will abide by the original plans.
We now calculate the optimal open-loop equilibrium in order to
In pinpoint the source of the time inconsistency. Starting with (10), we write
ISy the elements of the Amatrixas theB matrix as andthe C matrix
me as cjj(thespecific values of and aregiven in the footnote •
OW preceding equation (10)). In fact Ccanbe ignored under our simplifying
to assumption === 0fort ) 0. ThuSpg÷1 = a11pg + a12+
a13 + a14+ while similar expressions hold for p1'sand et+i.
Int The goal is to choose the sequence that maximizes U0 in (11) subject
to(l0). To solve this problem, we write down the Lagrangian 2' as follows:
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max 2—(i)
+/L1, + a12 + a13+a14 e1+b11mt
+ + a23 + a24 eg + b21mt —pg]
+1u3 t÷i[a3jpg + a32 + a33 qt—i + a34+ —
+1u4 t+i[agipg + + a43 qg_1 + a44 eg + b41 mt —
(12)
As is well known, and are shadow values which describe
how U0 is affected by different inherited values of Po' and q_1. In
particular, /L1,0= 3U0/ap0;it2,0 = and ,Lt3,0=
By analogy, equals that is it4,O measures the change in
intertemporal utility for a small change in e0. Unlike p0, and q_1,
however, the policymaker does not inherit e0, but rather determines e0 as
a function of the policies that are selected. Because e0 is a policy choice,
a necessary condition of the optimization must therefore be that
aU0/ae0 = =0.At the optimum, it41 will equal zero at t =0.
The time consistency problem arises because along the optimum
sequence will (in general) not always equal zero. (6u4g will follow
a difference equation of the form described in the Appendix). Sincewill
tend to move away from zero, reoptimization at any twhen+ 0 would
lead to a new sequence of m such thatwould again start at zero (a
necessary condition of the optimization). From a technical point of view,
the open-loop sequence is time consistent if and only if the equation for
canbe satisfied with g0 for all t0. If this condition is met, then
future governments will choose at all dates t even if they are not
bound by the original government. If the condition is not satisfied, the
open-loop solution makes sense only if future governments are not allowed
to reoptimize.
Consider a simple illustration using our model. We select simulation
values for the key parameters of the model, as shown in Table 7.1. The
economy inherits a ten-percent domestic inflation rate, and lagged full
employment (i.e. p00.10; p10.0;=0.0;q_10.0). With a
constant exchange rate (e0 =0),CPI inflation will equal ten percent in tur
period zero (i.e. ir0 =0.10), while a currency appreciation can reduce the
initial CPI inflation rate. Given our parameter values, the optimal
sequence is sharply contractionary at t =0,so that output is pushed
below zero, with the goal of reducing inflation. The real exchange rate
+ —p0 appreciates at t =0,4.7 percent above its long run value, with {t
the currency appreciation helping to export inflation abroad. Figure 7.1 in
shows the optimal paths of inflation, output, and the real exchange rate. in
















































7.1 Open-loop control in the one-country model
Consider the behavior of asshown in Figure 7.2. After t0,
turns positive, meaning that an increase in e would raise welfare. From
the point of view of the government at time t =3(1987), for example, the
original plan is too contractionary, since a currency depreciation would
raise welfare. A new optimization at t =3would lead to a new sequence
withrn3 > ph3. This is shown in Figure 7.3, where we superimpose
and Looselyspeaking, the initial government, at t0, has an
incentive to announce a stern set of future monetary policies in order to
induce a currency appreciation at t =0,and thereby to reduce(which
is otherwise very high). Of course, e0 can be reduced by extremely low m0







7.2 Shadow price on the
(one-country model)
exchange rate inopen-loop control
and higherfor t1, or by more moderate m0 and somewhat lower
fort1. The optimal policy is to opt for moderate m0 and low future m,
rather than extremely restrictive m0, since the approach with restrictive
future m achieves the same currency appreciation with a somewhat lower
loss of initial output, q0.
Thus, from the perspective at t0, it is worthwhile to commit future
m to low values for the sake of e0. However, from the perspective of future
governments, e0 is a bygone, and m should reflect tradeoffs in the present
and future, not the past. Thus, by the time a future government assumes
office, part of the original incentive to keep m low has disappeared,
and the new optimization in period t consequently yields a higher value
of mg.
It is interesting to note that there is a single special case in which the
open-loop policy is also time consistent, and that is when=0in the
original model (i.e. output is not affected by the real interest rate). In that
case, u4e0 satisfies the equation for P4tderivedin the Appendix.3 From
an economic point of view, wheno =0,only the exchange rate e0, but not
the sequence of future m, affects q0 and ir0, so that there is no reason to
prefer one path of m over another as long as they both lead to the same
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7.3 Reoptimization of open-loop control in 1987 (comparison with
original solution; one-country model)
e0. The same is true about all future ee. This property allows the original
government to specify a path that all future governments will be
content to honor.
The open-loop equilibrium is the best pre-commitment equilibrium
available. It is sometimes argued, however, that while governments cannot
credib)y pre-commit future governments to a sequence of policy moves,
they may be able to pre-commit governments to a specific policy rule for
mg. Such a closed-loop rule might not be as good as the open-loop result,
but it might be better than no rule at all. There is some merit to this
argument, as we shall soon see. The rule can of course be of varying
complexity. We illustrate this case by choosing a simple rule, which links
to the current state of the economy, as described by the vector
Such a rule is termed memoryless, in that the past history
of the economy, in arriving at <ps, is not permitted to affect
m1. We simplify further by specifying mt as a linear function of
and qg_1:
mt (13)
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Our method of solution is straightforward. A solution of the form (13) se
is guessed. Using (10) and the assumption that e0 places the economy on ta
the stable manifold, we find U0 as a function of the rule. Implicitly then
U0 =U0(/30, /32,/33). Usingastandard numerical optimization technique,
we then proceed to maximize U0 with respect to fin,/3j,/32,to arrive at
the optimal rule Given our assumed
parameter values for the structural model, we find:
mg (14)
Notethatthisistheoptimallinearruleforagivenx0 hi
q_1> =<0.1,0.0, 0.0>. For a different starting point, we would m
find a different rule.
is
Time-consistentequilibria
The previous equilibria depend on the unsatisfactory assumption
that future governments can be bound by rules made at an earlier date. inj
Some writers have suggested that macroeconomic policies must therefore
be formulated as constitutional rules, in order to bind successfully at a later
date. For many reasons, including conflicting views about the correct rules,
unwillingness to tamper with a constitution, and the realization that even
constitutions can be amended at a later date, there is little likelihood that (.1
the macroeconomic policy will soon be etched in constitutional stone. In SI:
practice, therefore, governments must operate with the knowledge that
future governments have freedom to change course and will have incentives
to do so, relative to the open-loop or closed-loop optimum, even when the
future governments share the goals of the earlier governments.
In this circumstance, we can reformulate the policy problem as a game
among an infinite number of players (i.e. governments), who are identified ii4
by the time period in which they act. The initial move is made by the
government at t =0(hereafter G0), then by G1, and so on. The payoff
functions foris and the move is
Now, we can think of various types of Nash equilibria among these
governments.In analogy to the pre-commitment case, we can think of fn
Nash equilibria in which each government takes as given the moves of other d9
governments, or Nash equilibria in which each government takes as given
policy rules of other governments. A Nash equilibrium in moves will be
called 'open-loop,' and a Nash equilibrium in strategies or policy rules will
be called 'closed-loop.'
Consider first the case of open-loop Nash equilibrium. Let denote
the sequence of moves before and after, but not including, period t:
in0, m1 An open-loop Nash equilibrium is aInternational coordination in dynamic macroeconomics 287
3
sequence with the property that for all governments mN is optimal
taking as given
is an open-loop Nash equilibrium if and only if for
all t,mf"maximizes Efi'subject to (10) and given {mN}_,.
(15)
In performing the optimization at period t,thegovernment assumes that
4) adjusts to keep the economy on the stable manifold, given the past
— historyof m, the current policy choiceand the assumed future path
N N
Id t+1't+2' . .
Withthis definition, the problem with the precommitment equihbnum
is that the resulting path is not a Nash equilibrium among the infinite
sequence of governments (this was verified in Figure 7.3). Taking as given
)fl thatother governments will play(the open-loop sequence), only the
•e initial government will want its part of the sequence (i.e. rh0). For all other
governments (in general), there will exist a superior choice of policy.
er Now, consider the 'closed-loop' version of Nash equilibrium, in which
we assume thatplays a rule (or strategy) J,whichmaps (xe, ...)
torather than just a moveAs before, define the sequence as
at (f0'f1'... ...). Now,we define a Nash equilibrium in this strategy
space as follows:
at is a closed-loop Nash equilibrium if and only if for all
es
t, ...)maximizes subject to (10),
and given (16)
In general, there will be many such Nash equilibria, some of which (as we
shall see) are not very desirable.
if As is typical in such circumstances, we further refine the nature of the
equilibrium to include only Nash perfect equilibria. A strategy sequence
is said to be a perfect equilibrium if for any history of the economy
from time 0 to t(evenhistories not resulting from a Nash equilibrium
during periods 0 to t),strategies constitute a Nash equilibrium in the
sub-game from t to CX).Wenow define time consistency:
time consistent if and only if is a Nash
11 perfect equilibrium. (17)
:e In general, open-loop Nash equilibria, as in (15), will not be perfect
equilibria. Suppose, for example, that the sequence th1, th2, ...hasthe Nash
a property. In most models, including those in our paper, the sequence288 GiftesOudiz and Jeffrey Sachs
rn2, rn3, ...willnot be subgame Nash (starting at period 2), if m1 is set
differently fromThus, from this point on, we restrict our search for
time-consistent equilibria to closed-loop Nash equilibria,in which
governments take as given the policy rules of other governments.
Unfortunately, even the perfectness concept does not eliminate the
problem of a multiplicity of equilibria. There will in general be many truly
time-consistent equilibria. To narrow the search, we begin with the In
simplest case,in which m1 is a function of the current state (b>
(= q1_1>) alone (see Maskin and Tirole (1983) for some justifi-
cation for restricting our search to such 'memoryless' strategies). Thus, we the
are searching for a function m1 =J(x1)suchthat:
1
e0:
m1=1(x1) maximizes /.?'subject to (10) and to the
1—1
1
restrictionthat m1 =1(x1)for all I + t. (18) equ
(Note that in this case the government at time Idoesnot actually care about
the rules up to time t,sincethe past is fully summarized in xg). Implicit
throughout is the assumption that e1 is always such as to keep the economy
on the stable manifold. In practice, this means that along withf there is
another function h linking e1 and x1: e1h(x1).
Our strategy is to search for famongthe class of linear functions.
Although we cannot prove that the resulting function is the unique
memoryless, time-consistent equilibrium, we suspect that itis in fact d[-
unique, in view of the linear-quadratic structure of the underlying problem.
Consider the necessary conditions for a time-consistent optimum. Let
m1 =v0+ ViPt + + y3 q1_1 be a candidate solution (call it the y-rule).
Plugging this rule into (10), we can also determine a unique linear rule
e1 = that keeps the economy on the stable
manifold. Now, suppose that these rules hold for all t1. It is possible to
calculate fit U1 as a function of the rule and the state of the economy
at t =1,i.e. x1. Let us call the value of the utility function V?'(x1), where mil
VYdenotes the dependence of utility on the rule v•
At time zero, the 0th government wants to maximize U1,which
equals U0 + fiI'7(x1)under the assumption that future governments will use
the y-rule. Note that x1 =<p1,q0>. Specifically, the initial government
solves the following:
max U0+PVT(p1, pg, q0)
mo
Subject to:
• (a) e1 =h0+ h1p1 + h2pg + h3 q0 m0
(b) Pi = +a13q_1+a14e0+b11m0International coordination in dynamic macroeconomics 289
et (c) pg = +a23q_1+a24e0+b21m0
(d)q0 = a31 p0 + a32 + a33 q_1 + a34 e0 + b31m0
(e)e1 = +a43q_1+a44e0+b41m0
(0
(g) Po' q_1 and given (19)
.1y
he In this optimization problem, (a) is determined by the candidate y-rule.
• (b)—(e) are the structural dynamic equations summarized in (10). (f) is the
fi instantaneous utility function (note that ir0 =pg Finally, (g) defines
we the state of the economy for the initial government.
The optimization is straightforward. Using (a) and (e) we can write
e0 =(l/a44)[h0+h1p1 +h2pg + h3q0 —a41p0 —a43 q_1—b41m0]. Now
• using (b), (c) and (d) together with the new equation for e0, we have four
•8) equations that make e0, pg. q0, and Pi linear functions of m0 and the pre-
determined variables p0, q_1. Let us write this system as:
•cit e0 =




ict d[ —+ +13 pg, q0)]/dm0 equals zero. By direct substitution we
nfl. have:
0 =




re This gives us a linear rule for m0 as a function of p0, q_1 and implicitly
-h
(through Vr) the y rule:
m0= [1/(d34+ [(d34 d31 + çbd24 d21)p0
nt +(d34 d32 d22)
+ (a d44 +(a d24
+ (a d34] (22)
Under our assumptions, the partial derivatives of V?' are linear functions
of p0, and q_1 (though not easy to write down analytically!). Thus,
m0 is a linear rule in p0, and q_1:
m0 = (23)290 Gilles Oudiz and Jeffrey Sachs
As long as (23) is the same as the y rule, we have found a stationary,
time-consistent rule. That is, for= =Yi'82= Y2' 83=y3,the y
rule is validated as a time-consistent policy. Starting at anyperiodsand
any state 1, the :th government will choose the y rule given that all future
governments will make that choice.
In general, the time-consistent rule must be found numerically (see
Cohen and Michel (1984) for an elegant treatment of the one-dimensional
case for the state vector x, for which an analytical solution is found). To
do so, we start with a finite-period problem, in which= Itis
then easy to find the optimal final period rule mT=fT(xT).GivenfT,fT.1
is readily found by the type of backward recursion just described. For each
T, we can readily computef0(x0). Denote this rule asfoT(x0) to denote the
dependence of the rule on the periods remaining. Then it is a simple matter
to find the limiting value as T-+ cc. The rule 1(x0) =lim
can then be verified directly to have the time-consistency, Nash equilibrium
property for the infinite-horizon game. We provide details of this method
in the Appendix.
Using the parameter values described earlier, the time-consistent rule is
calculated to be:
=— 0.032+ 1.032 + 0.275 qg_1 (24)
As is shown in the Appendix, the open-loop optimal policy can be written
as a linear function of the state variables and
= qg_1+O.389 (25)
Starting, as before, with 10 percent inflation, we can compute the path of
output and inflation for the time-consistent policy, for comparison with
the open-loop pre-commitment equilibrium. In Figure 7.4a, we compare
the inflation performance in the two cases; in Figure 7.4b, we compare the
exchange rates; and in Figure 7.4c, we compare the output paths. We have
already seen that the open-loop control holds future governments to an
over-coniractionary policy relative to the one that they would select upon
reoptimization. Since the time-consistent policy explicitly allows for
(expansionary) reoptimization in the future, it is not surprising that the a
real exchange rate is less appreciated in the time-consistent (TC) case than Mi
inthe open-loop (OL) case.Simply, agents recognize that future
governments will select more expansionary m, andis an increasing
function of the entire sequence of m. Thus, via the exchange
rate effect. In general, in the early periods, as governments in is
the OL case pursue a steady, contractionary policy. After a certain period
(shown as tin Figure 7.4c), the inequality is reversed. Both policies reduce
the inherited inflation to zero in the long run. SuTime-consistent rule
Open-loop optimal policy
7.4 A comparison of open-loop and time-consistent policies (one-country
model)
Before turning to a welfare ranking of the various policies, we must note
a key feature of the disinflation process (pointed out earlier in Buiter and
Miller (1982) and elsewhere). The price equation is:
(Pt+iPg) = ++O(q5 —
=p5+(l—A)(p'+e5—p5) = —A)r5, wherer5 (=
is the real exchange rate. Thus,
(Pt +(1 —A) —r1_1)+ i/Iqg+O(qg — (26)
Suppose an economy inherits an inflation rate of=p0—p1, with
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Now, for all of the equilibria so far considered, Pt÷i equals zero in the T
long run (i.e. inflation is eliminated),returns to zero (i.e. no long-run m
change in competitiveness), and qj returns to zero (i.e. long-run full CC




All policies have the same cumulative output loss, no matter what is the
time path of exchange rates, money, etc.! Thus, the welfare issue is always g
one of timing, rather than the overall magnitude of lost output. ft
On purely logical grounds, we can rank the welfare achieved by the three ti
policies so far studied: open-loop control, closed-loop control (with ai
pre-commitment), and time-consistent control. The open-loop control is
clearly first best, since both of the other solutions reflect the saftie
optimization, but under additional constraints. The closed-loop, linear
feedback rule also must produce higher utility than the time-consistent p
rule. Both the linear.rule and time-consistent solution chooseas a linear
function ofthe linear rule is chosen as the best among this class of IV
functions, so in particular it is better than the time-consistent rule. Thus
we know that U0OL ? In general, the inequalities will be strict,
though we have already noted special cases (e.g.=0)in which all of the 0
policies are identical. u
Buiter (1983) has recently proposed an alternative strategy for finding p
a time-consistent linear rule, which has also been treated at length by Miller ii
and Salmon (1983); (we describe Buiter's approach at length in the
appendix). His reasoning is as follows. Consider the open-loop control g
solution, with shadow prices andon the state variables, and
on the exchange rate. At t =0,the initial government chooses policies so
that 0. For t> 0, we know that will tend to deviate from zero.
Each government in period t would like to reset=0.Buiter proposes,
therefore, that a time-consistent solution is found by asswning that 1u4 0
for all t, and dropping the open-loop dynamic equation for Whenthis
procedure is followed, we obtain the following linear rule:
= (29)
There are two counts against this proposed solution. Most important, th
it is simply not time consistent. If all governments for r1 adopt the Buiter 1;
rule, the government at t =0would not choose this rule. By following theInternational coordination in dynamic macroeconomics 293
procedures described earlier (for calculating the best rule at t =0for a
ye given rule at tI) we find that the initial government would choose:
mt (30)
h
The logic underlying the Buiter solution seems problematic as well. The
e merit for a government to choose =0comes if the sequence of in
correspondingto=0will in fact be carried out by future governments.
U But, by construction, each succeeding government alters the chosen
sequence of m.Thereis simply no attraction to choosing=0if the
'8'
government knows that its plans will not be carried forward. The private
/ sector understands this point perfectly, by setting et to correspond to the
he actual sequence of m rather than to the sequence planned by each
government. In a nutshell, Buiter's government is naive in assuming that
future governments will carry out its open-loop optimum, at the same time
that the private sector is completely on top of the policy-making process,
ith and knows that future governments will reoptimize.
is
me Reputation and time-consistency
In the previous section we simplified our search for a time-consistent
policy to 'memoryless' rules. Such rules makea function of the
contemporaneous state vectorbut not of the past history of x and m.
of Many policies in the real world depend on the history of a game as much
tus as the current state. In competitive environments, for example, aggressive
ct, behavior by one player at time t —1might bring forward retaliation by
he others at period t, as in 'tit-for-tat' strategies. Game theorists have long
understood that such history-dependent strategies can help competing
ng players to achieve more efficient outcomes than those obtainable from
ler memoryless strategies alone.
he It turns out that similar complex strategies can help a sequence of
:ol governments to achieve a better equilibrium than the one obtained by the
memoryless rule= Consider a compound rule of the sort:
SO (a) Government t chooses its policy according to mg =g(xg),as
.0. long as all governmentsj < t have also selected policy this way;
eS, (b) If any governmentj < t selects in5 # g(x5), then government t
0 selects= where! is the memoryless, time-consistent
his rule. (31)
Suppose now that the rule g(xg) is better than in the sense that if all
- governmentst0 choose they achieve utility Ufl> u(. Also, suppose
nt, that g(xg) itself is not time consistent in the sense of(l9): If all governments
ter I1 are known to choose g(xg), it is not optimal for the government at
:he t =0to select g(x0).
7)294 Gilles Oudiz and Jeffrey Sachs
The surprising result is that while is not time consistent, a be
compound strategy like (31)(a)—(b) can be time consistent with the result go
that all governments end up playing leading to higher social welfare. se
In the memoryless time-consistency problem, each government takes as
given the choice of policy rule followed by future governments. If future su
governments are going to choose= the current government may hi
have no particular incentive to choose g. With a compound rule as in (31),
the government at time tknowsthat it affects the policy rule selected by go
future governments. It takes as given the two-part decision mechanism au
(a)—(b), but it recognizes that if it is the first government to deviate from
g(xg), it will cause all future governments to choose instead of g(xg).
Since (10> U1 by assumption, this deviation from imposes a cost,
which deters the government from deviating from
Thus, each government operates under a' threat' that future governments
will revert to play mt = Game
theorists have long recognized that such a threat mechanism is viable only mt
if the reversion is credible. For example, suppose that the rule is kn
'let money growth obey the open-loop strategy or else each future go
government lets money grow by one million percent.' If every government f]
takes it as given that future governments hold this rule, then money growth is
will indeed obey the open-loop strategy (governments would seek to avoid th
the hyperinflation that they fear would otherwise ensue). A true mt
intertemporal Nash equilibrium is obtained, iii which the open-loop mi
sequence is carried out by every government. The problem here, of course, in
is that the threat of hyperinflation is not rational. Surely, if any government eq
does violate the open-loop rule, the next government will not exercise the
threat. Knowing this, no government really has an incentive to persist in pr
the open-loop path. eq
Game theorists therefore restrict the threats to actions that would indeed as
be carried out if deviations from occur (even if, as in the example,
the threats need never actually be carried out).Itis here that the
assumption of perfection of equilibrium becomes important. In the m
hyperinflation example just cited, not all subgames are Nash, and thus
the proposed equilibrium is not perfect. To see this, suppose that G0
deviates. Even if G1 assumes that all future governments will play the
hyperinflation threat, it is not optimal for government 1 to play the threat,
Thus the subgame in which government 0 deviates, and all (1?I) let
m grow by I million percent per period, is not a Nash equilibrium. G1 can
do better unilaterally, taking as given the actions of other
As long as the reversion is to i.e. the threat is to return to the
time-consistent rule, the threat is credible. After all, if a government
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believes that all future governments will play J(xj, it is optimal for the
government itself to play Every subgame consisting of the infinite
sequence of governments is therefore a Nash equilibrium.
Now we argue that by this mechanism the sequence of governments can
re sustain any linear rule= aslong as the utility from this rule is
ay higher than the utility from the memoryless time-consistent rule for any
1) We want to show, therefore, that the following strategy for each
by government constitutes a perfect Nash equilibrium, in which= is
always played.
(a) Each government chooses= aslong as all governments
j <thave also selected this rule;
st, (b) If any government] <zselects a different thenall govern-
ments £ select (32)
•:its
ne Now let us examine the incentive of any government to deviate from
= Itknows that all future governments will then play But
is knowing that all future governments will play it is optimal for the
ire government in question to choose m1 as well, by the definition of
f In other words, if a government is going to deviate, the best deviation
ith is simply to revert to immediately. Thus, the cost of defecting from
)id the me= ruleis to revert immediately and permanently to the
•ue rule. Since utility is higher under / than f, there is never an
incentive to deviate from 1.Theequilibrium is since in any subgame
Se, in which a defection from= has occurred, it will be a Nash
equilibrium for all governments to revert
he For the case 00.0, we have found a rule= that has the
in property that and thus have verified that such reputational
equilibria exist in our model. With 0 =0,and all other parameter values
ed as in Table 7.1, the time consistent rule is:
me =O.l6SPe+I.165
he The following rule has higher utility for all
:us
G0 = =
The loss functions corresponding to these rules are:
let r1.726—1.726]





aNotethat the y-axis has been adjusted by a
multiplicative factor for graphical convenienëe.
7.5Thecost of reversion to time-consistent control
We have not found such an example for 0 > 0.0.
In an important sense, then, the time inconsistency problem is exagger-
ated, in that many 'pre-commitment' equilibria can probably be sustained
even in situations where actions of future governments cannot be bound.
The memoryless time-consistent equilibrium is the lower limit of what can
be obtained by a sequence of governments, not the only outcome. We
should stress, however, that time consistency does impose costs, since the
first-best, open-loop strategy almost surely cannot be sustained as a perfect
equilibrium. The reason is as follows. Suppose that the sequence of
governments pursues the open-loop solution under the threat of reversion
to if it ever violates the open loop rule. We know that it will
follow the sequence to which corresponds a sequence of states,
denoted Ateach t, we may calculate the utility of continuing with













Since S'—S' is positive definite, we have for all xg that c






















the open-loop sequence, with the utility of reverting to the
time-consistent equilibrium, The threat of reverting to f will
continue to work only when However, at some point
this equality is reversed, and the government at that date actually prefers
to revert to the time-consistent equilibrium. Knowing that such a date will
be reached, earlier governments will also know that the open-loop path
ler- cannot be sustained. This phenomenon is shown in Figure 7.5, where at
tied each t, we graph with thecalculated along the
nd. open-Loop path. As long as is positive, the government
can at t does not have an incentive to deviate. At time I (here 1987), the
We government prefers to revert to the time-consistent solution.
the
fect HI Policy coordination in the two-country model
ion The first part of the paper has dealt with economic policy in a single
will economy. We now extend the same set of techniques to a two-country
tes, setting: The goal is to compare 'non-cooperative' equilibria (NC), in which
vith each country optimizes while taking as given the policies abroad, with
0 - - —- --
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'cooperative' equilibria (C), in which binding commitments can be made co
between the two countries. Formally, we treat the cooperative case as one de
in which a single controller chooses the policies of the two countries. As at
in the early section, we must treat two separate types of equilibria: (1) the pr
pre-commitment case, in which the two countries (in NC) or the single or
controller (in C), can credibly pre-commit to a rule or to an infinite
sequence of actions; and (2) the time-consistent case, in which no pre- to
commitment in future periods is possible. We turn first to the pre-commit- its
ment case. to
Open-loop control and policy coordination Su
The open-loop case is most easily dealt with (policy coordination sd
in the open-loop case is also discussed in Buiter and Miller (1983) and Sachs
(1983)). We first append a symmetric foreign-country model to the
home-country model just discussed. The model is shown in Table 7.2. In Fr
the NC solution, each government at t =0solves for an optimal sequence co
of monetary policies taking as given the sequence selected from abroad. to
In the C solution, a single controller chooses and tomaximize
a weighted average of intertemporal utilities at home and abroad. In view of
of the symmetry assumed between the countries, will equal
as a feature of both solutions, with the adjustment paths at home and
abroad identical. The key result is that non-cooperative control leads to of
over-contractionary anti-inflation policies the social optimum.
Both countries are made better off by a coordinated policy of less rapid foi
disinflation. wi
In general, the dimensionality of the control problem is too high to
analyze the NC case analytically. An important special case, however,
allows us to establish analytically the key features of the NC versus C
solutions. Since the findings are insightful, we begin with that special case.
In particular, we first assume that aggregate demand and money demand N
are not interest sensitive (a =e=0in the original model). This simplifi- frd
cation allows us to determineas a function of the current state vector a
together withand mt, rather than as a forward-looking variable
dependent on the entire future sequence of policies. Also, to reduce further
the dimensionality, we set 0 =0,so that wage change depends on the level
of output but not its lagged rate of change. Nc'
Denoting the real exchange rate as=p'+ et we can write
P1 =Pt+(l and =(Pt—Pt_i)+(l
Therefore, from the wage equation, and the fact that Pt =we have
=+ (1 —A)— + Note from this expression that inflation
accelerated when >or> 0. In other words, a real depreciation
between periods t and 1+ 1 causes inflation to accelerate, basically because
real import prices rise. Carrying out the same manipulation for the foreignInternational coordination in dynamic macroeconomics 299
ie countryyields =ir'—(I Note thatareal
ne depreciation at home causes inflation to fall abroad, while an appreciation
at home causes foreign inflation to rise. Here is the nub of the coordination
he problem: each country may have an incentive to contract the economy in
'le order to appreciate the currency and thereby export inflation abroad at
•'te the expense of the other country. Since the exchange rate effects are bound
to cancel out if each country chooses contractionary policies to appreciate
it- its currency, a coordinated policy can avoid the contractionary policies,
to the mutual benefit of both countries.
It only remains to determine rg before solving for the two equilibria.
Subtracting the foreign aggregate demand schedule from the home
—on schedule we find:
-:hs = z=(1+y)/28> 0 (33)
•he
In From (33), we see that the key to a real appreciation is to be more
ice contractionary than one's neighbor. The effort towards contraction leads
• to the inefficiency of the non-cooperative outcome.
ize In any period,and p' are predetermined variables, so that the choice
of mg and m' fixand qt respectively, in view of the money demand
schedules. Thus, we may think of the policy authorities as controlling qt
nd and qt directly, and then use the sequences and to find the paths
to of prices and the policiesand m' and p+ctq'.
m. We now write the home country's in canonical
,id form. At any moment, there are two state variables,and andwe
write the dynamic system in terms of these states:
to IPe+i1 _12 —11[Pt1+ *
J —ioj j —v)jLxl—y)j
qg
se. (34)
Note that qgisthe control variable, andis an exogenous forcing variable
6- from the point of view of the home country. The objective function is again





Weset up a Lagrangian 2 and take first-order conditions in the
standard way (note that ,U1g is the co-state variable for
2'
+1u1g[2pg ++ a(l —y)(qg —
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=0= = Pt+ tx(l — —
=0=
itP2t-iIfl= 0
We now invoke a sleight of hand. The foreign country is carrying out an
identical optimization, which by symmetry must yield qe =Without
specifying the foreign country's problem, we simply invoke this symmetry
condition as a property of the equilibrium, in order to simplify the first-








By direct inspection of (37)(b) and (c), we can see that the system will
satisfy jU2t= We now make that substitution and also substitute for




Aslong as fi< [1— —y)thissystem has a single root within the unit
circle and a single root outside the unit circle (the condition is sufficient,
though not necessary).s Denote the stable root as (thesuperscript N
denotes non-cooperative case). Thus, the dynamics of inflation are:
= (39)
Startingfrom an inherited inflation rate ir0, the two economies converge
to zero inflation, with a mean lag of years. af
Now let us consider the cooperative case. Here, a single controller T
choosesandto maximize an average of utilities in the two countries.
Since the countries are identical, we may assume simply that the controller

























7.6 A comparison of non-cooperative and cooperative control (simplified
39) two-country model)
rge
allt. With this constraint, the inflation equation is =
iler The Lagrangian for the single controller problem is therefore:
jes.
Iler 'max 2= (40)
for t—o
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Notethe relationship between (38) and (41). The cooperative dynamics
are found by setting=0in (38).is the parameter which measures how
large a real appreciation is achieved for a given contraction of q relative
to q*. It thus indicates the importance of the 'beggar-thy-neighbor'
phenomenon, which each country (vainly) attempts to keep output lower
at home than abroad in order to export inflation. Since the single controller
recognizes the futility of each country, in a closed system, trying to export
inflation, the controller simply sets=0.That is the root of the gain to
cooperation.
The matrix in (41) again has a single stable root, this time denoted
The dynamics of inflation are now
(42)
It is a simple matter to prove that>for> 0, so that
control resultsin slower disinflation than non-cooperative control.7
Figure 7.6 illustrates the inflation and output paths of the home economy
under cooperation and non-cooperation. The faster disinflation under NC
is clearly brought about by increased unemployment (i.e. reduced output)
in the early years of the disinflation process. Remember from our earlier
discussion that the cumulative output loss is the same for all paths that
asymptotically reduce inflation to zero.
Welfare aspects of cooperation
Assuming that governments are pursuing appropriate objectives Si!
(e.g. that they use the 'right' discount rate), it is easy to show that the kr
cooperative path, with less extreme disinflation, dominates the non-
cooperative path. A simple argument is as follows (direct computation du
would also make the same point). Define the set of pareto efficient (E) pairs
of sequences thathave the property that U0 is maximized thd
given and U is maximized given U0. It is well known that the set of
pareto efficient pairs may be found by maximizing wU0+(l —w) U with PO%
respect to and for all weights w€ [0, 11. Every pareto efficient di
sequencepair maximizes some weighted average of U0 and U, and every
sequence pair that maximizes wU0 +(1 —w)is pareto efficient. In
The cooperative solution, by construction, gives the sequence pair ret
corresponding to w =0.5(i.e. equal weighting of the countries). It is the
unique solution to the problem. Since the non-cooperative solution also no
yields a symmetric equilibrium, with U0 =U,it must be that < tr













Note that the welfare scale on the y-axis has been adjusted by
a multiplicative factor for graphical convenience.
7.7 The gains from cooperation with myopic governments
since otherwise the non-cooperative solution would pareto dominate a
known pareto efficient solution.
We mentioned in the introduction that some critics of cooperation are
dubious of the assumption that governments maximize the proper social
welfare function. In particular, plausible arguments have been made that
the government's discount rate fiGisless than the 'true'fi.Ifso,
cooperation might exacerbate rather than meliorate social welfare. The
point is that cooperation allows governments to pursue a more 'leisurely'
disinflation. However, short-sighted governments might already be post-
poning the necessary disinflation, in return for short-run gains to output.
In an already distorted policy environment, cooperation might further
retard the necessary adjustment.
To examine this view, we computed the open-loop cooperative and
non-cooperative intertemporal utilities for a range of fl°,holdingfixed the
'true' fiat.(l.l)'(we use the simplified version of the two-country model





























for these calculations). For each fiG, we calculate the two equilibria and
then evaluate the social welfare of the resulting paths using fi =(1.1)—'.
As seen from Figure 7.7 non-cooperation dominates cooperation when fiG
is sufficiently smaller than fi, and cooperation dominates non-cooperation
as long asis 'close enough' or somewhat greater than fi. Of course,
for any fiG =fi,open-loop cooperation will necessarily be superior to
open-loop non-cooperation. It is not the level of fi° but the difference of
j3G and fi which mightcause cooperation to be welfare reducing.
Policy coordination and time consistency
We now leave the case of open-loop control and return to the more
realistic assumption that governments cannot bind their successors. In the
non-cooperative setting we are looking for an equilibrium characterized
by rules and=f*(xt)thathave the following property: for
the home country,f is optimal at time t given that all future governments
I
at home play f and that abroad the contemporaneous and all future
governments playf*; while for the foreign countryf* is optimal under
the analogous conditions. Note thatis the state vector including
predetermined variables of both the home and foreign economy. In
t• 1 —/ * C C* * paricu ar, Xt —\Pt,PtPg—i' Pt—i, qt—i,
There are two key differences with the open-loop model previously
described. First, of course, is the inability of G0 andto bind the entire
sequence of future moves. Second is the assumption that each government
takes as given the foreign rule rather than the foreign actions, so that
optimal moves today take into account the effects of today's actions on
tomorrow's state vector, and thus on the foreign governments' moves. It
would be possible instead to calculate a time-consistent multicountry towa
equilibrium in which each government takes as given the sequence of future to th
moves (i.e. open-loop time consistency), but we have not pursued that Si1
choice here. open
As in the one-country case, the time-consistent equilibrium is solved as as it
the limit of a backward recursion. (For the calculations that follow, we one-o
revert to the complete two-country model, with non-zero values of sequd
and 0.) Using the parameter values of the one-country model, we arrive unde4




+ 0.328 qg+O.O5 qt (43)
Figure 7.8 compares the paths of the home economy output for the now
non-cooperative open-loop and non-cooperative time-consistent equilibria, as wej
As in the one-country model, output losses are smaller in the early periods to a s4










nent Open-loop optimal policy
that 7.8 A comparison of non-cooperative control: open-loop versus time-
s on consistent solutions (two-country model)
It
towards more expansionary policies and thus more rapid inflation, relative
.ture to the open-loop solution.
that Significantly, itis no longer possible to rank social welfare under
open-loop versus time-consistent policies (for non-cooperative equilibria),
d as as it was in the one-country model. Remember the argument in the
we one-country context. Open-loop control, by definition, picks the optimal
€, sequence;time-consistent policy, on the other hand, reflects an optimization
under additional constraints and therefore is inferior to the open-loop
control. In the two-country setting, the same logic does not apply. The
open-loop sequence is no longer the optimal sequence. Indeed we have seen
that open-loop, non-cooperative control is typically Pareto inefficient.
(43) There is no presumption that adding constraints to the optimization will
the now lower welfare, particularly since constraints are being added abroad
)ria. as well as at home. It is true that the home country can no longer pre-commit
iods to a sequence of moves, but now neither can the foreign country. It is true
bias that the home country prefers an open-loop to time consistent policy
rto
e of
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assuming that the other country isfixedat one or the other. With the other
country's policy fixed, an open-loop policy at home can exactly replicate
the time-consistent sequence, and presumably it can do better.
There are good economic reasons to believe that the time-consistent
policy may actually dominate the open-loop solution in the non-cooperative
game. The open-loop policy, we know, is over-contractionary relative to
the efficient equilibrium. Moving from open-loop control to time consist-
ency causes policy to become less contractionary and therefore pushes the
economy towards the efficient equilibrium.
Now, let us consider the time-consistent cooperative equilibrium. Here
we imagine that a single controller each period sets m and m*, but now
subject to the time-consistency constraint. The single cooperative controller
must optimize while taking as given the actions of single cooperative
controllers in later periods. We should like to determine whether time-
consistent cooperation is superior to time-consistent non-cooperation. As
we have noted in several places Rogoff (1983) has devised an ingenious
example where cooperation reduces welfare. Simply, time-consistency
leads governments to be over-inflationary relative to the open-loop
pre-commitment equilibrium. Cooperation further exacerbates this over-
inflationary bias by removing each government's fear of currency
depreciation.
Interestingly, our results run counter to Rogoff's: cooperation is
superior in welfare terms to non-cooperation: While the cooperative
solution is more inflationary (see Figure 7.9), as we might expect, it is not
overly inflationary in a welfare sense. The less rapid disinflation merely
corrects the contractionary bias of the non-cooperative case. The key point
here is as follows. In the symmetric country model, the single controller
always adopts symmetric rules so that et =0for all t. Since the exchange
rate is the sole potential source of time inconsistency in this model, and
since it is always equal to zero, the cooperative time-consistent solution
is also the open-loop cooperative solution. For a cooperative controller,
there is no time-consistency problem in our model (since the countries are
symmetric). The single controller can reach the first-best optimum solution
for open-loop cooperative control.
In sum, we have shown examples where cooperative control is more
inflationary than open-loop non-cooperative control and time-consistent
non-cooperative control. In both cases, the cooperative solution is welfare
improving relative to the non-cooperative equilibrium. In view of Rogoff's
example, it will be difficult indeed to set out general principles on the gains
from cooperation under the constraint of time consistency. Comparing our
example with his, the key difference seems to rest on the source of the
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forward-looking wagesettersand cooperation exacerbates the problem. In wh
our model, the problem arises from forward-looking exchange market an
participants, and cooperation eliminates the problem. 4
Conclusions
Thisstudyrepresents work in progress on the gains to coordination
in dynamic macroeconomic models. Our focus has been purely methodo- of
logical, and preparatory to attempts at a quantitative assessment of
international policy coordination. The methodological issues arise from
the wide variety of possible equilibrium concepts in multicountry dynamic
games. The games can be solved under the assumption of pre-commitment
versus time-consistency; open-loop versus closed-loop behavior; and
non-cooperative versus cooperative decision-making. These three dimen-
sions are all independent, so any choice along each dimension is possible.
Moreover, in some cases there may be multiple equilibria. For example,
there are probably many time-consistent, non-cooperative equilibria that
depend on the 'threat-reputation' mechanism outlined in the paper. As yet,
we have made no systematic attempt to search for such equilibria.
This work should now be used to gain empirical insight into the
cooperation issue. For all of the discussion surrounding time consistency,
Ii
for example, there is not a single empirical investigation of its importance in
in the macroeconomics literature. Similarly, there are no reliable measures an
of the gains to cooperation the simpler, pre-commitment equilibria. Such fin
quantitative work deserves a high priority.
th
Appendix I
Weshall present in this appendix the derivation of the four policy rules•
discussed in this paper. All of these rules are obtained as the stationary
limit of backward recursions using a methodology similar to Basar and (A
Olsder (1982) or Kydland (1975). The only significant difference with these
authors is the fact the followers' actions are represented here by a
forwardlooking variable, the exchange rate.
Let us consider a two-country world. The world economy is characterized
byan n-dimensional vector of state variables, xt and the domestic currency
price of the foreign currency isIneach country the authorities seek to
maximize a welfare function I =1,2, and can use a set of policy
instruments denoted where is an mi-dimensional vector. The Sti
dynamics of the world economy can be represented by a system of
difference equations.
(Al) W
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__
In wheredenotes the stacked vector of instruments for the world economy
ket and A, B, C, D, F and G are matrixes of parameters. Note that matrixes
A, B, C are defined differently than matrixes A, B, C in the rest of the
chapter.
Let us denote bythe vectors of targets for each country.and T2t
• are linear functions of the state variables, the exchange rate and the values
io- of the policy instruments:
•
=Xt ++ I =1,2 (A2)
nic where M2,andare matrixes of parameters.





•)le st. (Al), (A2)
hat whereis a matrix of parameters andis a discount factor.
jet,
The time-consistent solution
the The time-consistent, non-cooperative equilibrium is found as a
limit to a finite-time (Tperiod) problem, for Tiarge. The solution is derived
•tice in two steps. The finite-horizon problem is solved for the last period, T,
res and then it is solved for period tgiventhe solution for period t+1. We
ich find the limit of the rule for period 0, as T-÷ co.
In period T+ 1 we assume that the exchange rate has stabilized, and that




nd (Al) and (A3) imply that:
eT(1 —F)'(DxT+GUT) =JTXT±KTUT (A5)
Given XT, the authorities of country 1 choose such as to maximize




he Substituting (A5) into (A2) leads to the following first order condition:
of —F)' Gj'Q,[N1+L1(lF)'G} UT
= + L1(l —F)'G1] Q,[M, + L1(l —F)'D] XT (A6)
1) Where and G2 are the submatrixes of N, and G which correspond
to
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A similar condition can be derived for country 2 which yields: wh
MMTUT=-NNTxT
U1
whereMMTis an(m1+ m2) x (m1 + m2) dimensional matrix. We shall give
below the explicit forms ofMMTandNNTas functions ofandKT.





eT =(1—F)-'(D+GrT)XT =HTxT (A8)



















The value function ofcountry 1for period tis defined by: no4
= givenXe (A15)
di
Substituting (A 13) into (Al) and (A2)leads to the following first order
conditions:
[(N11+ L1 K11)' Q1(N1 + L1 K1) +/31(C1 + BK11)' S1141(C+ BK1)] U1 thi
=— [(N11+ L1 K11)' Q1(iil1 + L1 pr
+fl1(C1+ BK11)' + BJ1JJ (A 16) dif
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where and C1 are the submatnxes ofand C corresponding to
U1g.
A similar set of conditions holds for country 2. We thus obtain:
=— xg (Al 7)
where is an (ni1 +m2) x (m1 +m2) dimensional matrix and NNg is an
+ m2) x n dimensional matrix.





=+Ku)' Qg(Ngj + Lg Kjg) + +
(A19)
2 =+ Qg(Mj + +/ij(Cg + BKgg)' +
(A20)
'en, These formulae hold for period T withand KT defined as above and





We have thus obtained both recursion rules and starting values for the
set of matrixes I, Hg,andWe define as the time consistent solution
14) the stationary solution to which this system converges for t =0as T goes
to infinity. We do not know of any general result concerning the
convergence of this process. However in our empirical applications we have
not run into major problems. Cohen and Michel (1984) show that in a one
15) dimensional case this kind of a recursion does have a fix-point.
ler The open-loop solution
The open-loop solution corresponds to a one-shot game where
the authorities announce at time zero the whole path of their policies. It
thus does not by definition require the use of a backward recursion
procedure. The set of dynamic equations formed by the state variable
6) difference equations and the first-order conditions corresponding to the
optimal control problem of the authorities could for example be solved
aa
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explicitly by using the method proposed in Blanchard and Kahn (1980)
or numerically with a multiple shooting algorithm (see Lipton, Poterba,
Sachs and Summers (1982)). However, we shall present here a backward
recursion procedure which leads to a simple algorithm.
The optimal control problem faced by the authorities of country i leads Eç
to the definition of the Hamiltonian
= + ++
++ — (A24)
where is the vector of co-state variables or shadow costs which the WI
authoritiesof country I associate with each of the state variables and, rer
similarly ,Uje÷jisthe co-state variable corresponding to the exchange rate.8
The set of first-order conditions is then:
= =0 (A25)
= Q1+ +flj = (A26)
= =
Let us first of all derive the recursion equations at period t. One major
wli
difference with the time consistent case is the existence of /tg,theco-state ani
variable corresponding to the exchange rate at time t. Since e0 is not
pre-determined, it can be set freely by the authorities in the initial period
by announcing a proper path of future policies. Its shadow cost in the first
period,is zero.is thus a predetermined variable equal to zero in the
first period and has to be added to the vector of state variables,when
the recursion relations are defined.
More precisely we shall assume that the problem is solved for t + I and
that the following relations hold:
eg+i = xt+i + ,ag+i (A28)
(A29)
=f'e+iXt+i+Yt+t/Lt+i (A30)
Let us now define the following matrixes:
At2 1=1,2 (A3l)
Al3 Al3 A13=flfF wh
Akj[4L
2] (A32)
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80) A11A12A,3]
ba, A1 A21A,,A2, (A33)
ard A3,A,,A,,]
ads
Equations(A25) to (A27) can be rewritten in matrix form:
A1 = 00'2n + 00[xe]
(A34)
24) Ite+, 000 p,] o'2
where '2fl and '2 denote identity matrixes of dimensions 2n and 2
the respectively. Then using equations (A28) to (A30) we get:
nd,
—te.8 eg = (A35)
Tt= (A36)
25) r, 1
26) Pe+i= /Lt÷, (A37)
27)
/Lt+, LPtj
whereand are the stacked vectors of targets and co-state variables
-. and
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From (A38) we can derive 1, andwhere the two last wi
variables are defined by:
Lastly we get: Eq
=Jt+KJ't+Re11t
=
We now need to obtain starting values for the recursions thus defined.
If we assume as above that the exchange rate stabilizes at time T and that
Th
RrO =0;
The open-loop solution is the stationary limit to which this recursion
converges. It should be noted that here the policy rule is not only a function
of the state variables,but also of the costate variables
Let us give a simple example in the case where each country has a single
policy instrument. The policy rule is=+ where y is a (2 x 2)
matrix. We also have:
an =
which,given the policy rule, yields:
=
wi
Thus we finally obtain
=
The policy rule appears to be of a more complicated form than the time
consistent rule. It is a function not only of the current state variables but
of the lagged values of these state variables and of the lagged moves.
The Bwter solution
Buiter (1983) proposes a solution to the time inconsistency T
problem which we discuss in the paper. Formally his strategy amounts to
settingequal to zero and suppressing equations (A37).
Using the same notation the set of first order conditions becomes:
A1 1 =


























Ut From (A38) we derive 1 and A2 which give H2:
H2 =J1+K21
The system of recursive equations thus obtained is solved backward from
cy T with the same starting values as above:
to
=(1—F)1D; KT(l —F)'G;4T4-1 =0
The optimal linear rule
The problem here is to derive the optimal linear rule, i.e. the
constant feedback rule which yields the highest welfare for the authoritiesa
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of each country. It can be divided into two steps. The first step consists
in obtaining for a given rule
r= F'lsuchthat L'J
U,= the value of the welfare foreachcountry, W,(fl and W,(fl. Then, 2
in a second step, the optimal values ofand 1 are calculated using a
numerical gradient method. We shall not discuss here the second step. The
first step is again solved by backward recursion which proved more




Forperiod T assuming eT+l =eTyields
eT =(1—F)-'(D+GflXT =HTxT (A40)
Then if we assume: et+i =
=(F— B)1 + CT')—(D+ Gfl]xg (A41)
the recursion is thus simply
=(F— B)-' + Cfl—(D + Gfl] (A42)
which, starting with HT, has a stationary solution for values of the 3
parameters such that the transition matrix in (A39) has only one eigenvalue
greater than unity. More precisely:
urn H0=
whereC22 and C2, are submatrixes of C, the matrix of row eigenvectors
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the 3 Using the notation of the appendix, it is readily checked that if r =0,Cand
slüe N1 in (Al) are null matrixes, and G in (Al) is equal to —p. This implies that
the money stock has no direct effect on either the state variables or on the
government's targets: output and inflation. Thus the first-order condition
(A25) reduces to =0.
4 This point is easily proved by considering the following change of variables:
=
where=
The differential system (38) becomes:
1/fl+ç6%(t2 —I/fl
=
cl-,-1 0 0 1/fl
This system is saddle point stable under the conditions discussed in the text
and has one stable root Af' and two unstable rootsand I/fl. One variable
lTrisbackward looking andare forward looking. Given that 1/fl> 1,
it is clear from the third equation that along the stable pathmust always
be equal to zero, so that=—/L2t forall t.
vish 5 The toots of the system can be found by solving the characteristic equation:
and
usly A2.—(&i+ =0,where=[I318 Gilles Oudiz and Jeffrey Sachs
We assume w > 0. To show that there is exactly one stable root 0 < 1 and
one unstable root 1 <Ac',observethe values of the characteristic equation C(A)
atA= 0and A =1.C(0)= (l/fl)w> 0 and C(1)= [1/fl—I] Bla
ifra(l —y)<0. Also, for AI,C(A)>0. Thus, there is exactly one root
between 0 and 1, and one root exceeding 1. Bw
The stable root is
The unstable root is:
(w+
Cal
6The roots for the cooperative case can be found by setting a =0(i.e. &j= 1) Co
in the equations for the roots derived in note 5.
Thestable root is
=(I+ 1/fl+ —[(1+ 1/fl+ —4/fl]i. Do
The unstable root is Ky
= + +
(
7It was shown in note 6 that=when a =0.To prove that>for ¶










Takingthe square root of both sides and dividing gives Ph
(u —1/,8+ {(u — l//3+ < 1
Substituting into the expression for wesee
<0 for all a.
Thus > 0 for all a.
8 Note that in the paper the notation is slightly different, being the co-state
variable corresponding to the exchange rate in the one-country case.
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COMMENT JORGE BRAGA DE MACEDO
Between the Fall of 1982 and the early Summer of 1984, Sachs has written
three (or four depending on the count) papers on international policy
flCY coordination.In the Spring of 1983, with the collaboration of Oudiz, line
output accelerated tremendously. It also became more quantitative: only
.n a a few months ago, Gilles and Jeff found the gains from international policy
-21. coordination to be empirically modest.a
320 Commentby JorgeBraga de Macedo
Unlike the remarkable Brookings paper, however, this one has no punch
line. Called 'research in progress' in the conclusion, itsets out to el
investigate three points: whether dynamics make a difference; how
international policy coordination interacts with the political business cycle;
and the implications of the inability of governments to bind their
successors. The last point, by investigating time-consistent solutions, is an
elaboration of the first. The second point is discussed graphically toward
the end of the paper. It is ignored in the discussion to follow. The same
for the empirical significance of time-consistency, which deserves 'high
priority' in the authors' concluding judgement. Whilst in agreement, I b
deleted remarks on empirical models of policy coordination to share the
'pure methodological focus' of the paper.1 The model used to illustrate re
the method will be discussed first. It is presented in Table 7.2 while
parameter values used in the numerical simulations are in Table 7.1.
The first pair of equations defines the IS curves at home and abroad:
q=6r+yq*_q(i_p) (1)
Since the parameter y is set to zero in Table 7.1, trade between the two
countries is unresponsive to output (marginal propensities to import are
zero). As a consequence, the coefficient on the real exchange rate (r) is to
be interpreted as the average propensity to import times the sum of the
trade elasticities less one times the inverse of the (common) marginal
propensity to save. Unitary elasticities, and an average propensity to
import of 0.25 (the same as 1—A, the share of foreign goods in the
consumer price index) would give 6 =1.5—asin Table 7.1 —ifthe savings fr
propensity is 0.17. But the experiments where 8 is infinite require infinite
elasticities which are implausible in a two-country world. The parameter
o. represents the real interest semi-elasticity of investment. Given the value
of the savings propensity and a share of investment like the share of
imports, the value u =1.5implies an elasticity higher than the steady-state
real interest rate. If there is no steady-state inflation, a nominal interest th1
rate of 10% would given an elasticity of 0.125. Since the nominal interest m4
rate is deflated by the proportional change in domestic prices rather than
in the consumer price index, the change in the real exchange rate does not al
affect investment.2 N
The second pair of equations defines the LM curve at home and abroad. Ic,
2.
m—p=csq—ei (2)
Money balances are also deflated by domestic prices, so that there is no
direct effect of the real exchange rate on money demand.3 The parameter al
isset to one in Table 7.1. The value of e =0.5implies that the interest is
elasticity, of money demand is one half of the steady-state level of the chInternational coordination in dynamic macroeconomics 321
ich interest rate or 0.05. This makes it 2.5 times smaller than the real interest
to elasticity of investment.
Equations (1) and (2) can be combined into an aggregate demand curve
which involves the real exchange rate, the domestic real money stock
(denoted by a bar) and the rate of domestic price inflation (denoted by y):
•an
(3)
•igh Unlike the Brookings paper, which introduced an elegant portfolio
t,1 balance model, this one makes the usual assumption that domestic and
the foreign money are perfect substitutes (e=is). The rate of change in the





(I) Substituting for q and q* from (3), there obtains a steady-state
proportional relationship between the real exchange rate and relative real




the '2(o+ c) 2(cr + e)
Suppose the two countries set m and m* so as to minimize a quadratic
the function of the deviation of domestic output and the consumer price index
from steady-state
ngs
iite U = —A)r]2} (6)
ter
lue Then a price rigidity p == pwill imply a loss of ç5p2 if both countries
of set ifi == 0since it is evident from (5) that, in that case, q = 0.
ate If, instead, each country attempts to appreciate the exchange rate, taking
'est the other country's money stock as given, they will bothend up with a lower
'est money stock. Loss in this Cournot-Nash non-cooperative solution is
ian magnified by ç5[(l —+ + €)]2.Othernon-cooperative solutions,
allowing for a non-zero conjectural variation, imply a lower loss than the
Nash.5 Still, with the parameter values of Table 7.1, the squared term is
ad. less than 1 %,sothat loss varies from 2p2 in the cooperative solution to
2.02 p2 in the Nash non-cooperative solution. This summarizes the results
(2) of a static policy game.
no Coming back to the dynamics, they are certainly not confined to (4)
ter above. There is also an equation for the change in nominal wages which
est is a function of the change in consumer prices (with a one-period lag), the
the change in output and its level in the previous period. The model does not322 Comment by Jorge Braga de Macedo
distinguish between wages and the price of domestic output, so that this
is also the equation for domestic price inflation (y). Usually, domestic
inflation is made proportional to the difference between demand and
supply for domestic output. Aggregate supply is in turn derived from a
Cobb-Douglas production function with capital fixed, labor demand
responding to the product wage and labor supply responding to the wage
deflated by the consumer price index
(7)
where c' is the share of capital in output and n is the labor supply
elasticity S
Theauthor's formulation is, instead: C.
(8)
Equation (8) assumes that 0(1 —c')n =1(or, with c' =0.5,a labor
supply elasticity of 6.7) since the real exchange rate elasticity is larger by i¶
1/(1 + nc')when the product wage is fixed. More importantly, it incorporates
the effect of cumulative output on inflation. If there is some inherited
domestic price inflation, say y0, then it allows full employment, no inflation
and no change in the real exchange rate in steady-state: V
(8')
The welfare effect of different policies refers only to the timing of output
losses, given by Alternatively, even with=0,as in Buiter and
Miller (1982), the measure of output losses could be —(1
or the change in the real exchange rate.
Using m as a policy variable, and ignoring the foreign variables, the
system of(3), (4) and (8) has a block-triangular state-space representation
in terms of p, r, y and q:
1 0 0 0 p0010p Ô
0 1 0 0 r —0—1— r ——
C C +em
0—l+A 1—0 j) 00 0
0 0 q 0
The system in (9) has one positive root, associated with the jump variable
r, and three negative roots, as required for saddle-point stability. The
objective function of the domestic authorities is expressed in terms of the in




Several numerical solutions of the maximization of (10) subject to (9)
are presented in Section II of the paper, about two-thirds of the text.
A natural welfare ranking, based on the constraints to optimization, is
given for the one-country model: open-loop control first, closed-loop
control second and time-consistent control third. Time-consistent control,
• though, does not rely on precommitments, so that the first best policy may
not be feasible. If the search is not confined to linear memoryless rules,
so that the threat of reversion to the undesirable line consistent rule is
credible (because then the first best open-loop strategy can
be sustained.7 At the end of Section II, of the model with 0 =0in (8) is
used to suggest that the utility difference between the first best rule and
the time consistent rule is given by (y—O.25 r)2/l000. For the 10%
• inherited inflation rate mentioned in the paper and r =0,this would
be
The numerical rules presented before this example reflect the version of
the model where 00. They seem to suggest that is superior to
which in turn is superior to mTC. This involves comparing the following
expressions (we keep here the discrete time notation of the authors and
their equation numbers preceded by a):
M?L =— 1.038+0.257 qg_j—O.Ol 1 (a14)
=— 1.019lTt+O.255 qg_1+O.389
= — 1.032irg+0.258 (a24)
It is noted that andthat in the early periods.
The open-loop policy is overcontractionary (given the total output loss)
as far as future governments are concerned. While no ranking is given, the
Buiter (1983) notion of time consistency (which does not allow the
government to optimize on the exchange rate and thus sets=0)
involves:
=—0.763 qg_1 (a29)
The time inconsistency of the rule is demonstrated by computing the first
period money stock under the Buiter criterion:
1y70BU=1.147 0.287 r_1 + 0.309 q_1 (a30)
There is no guidance in the paper as to the interpretation of these results,
in contrast with the experiments the authors run in the Brookings paper.
The research design seems to change in Section II, where the two-country



















j324 Comment by Jorge Braga de Macedo
model is solved analytically in a special case and the cooperative and
non-cooperative solutions are rooted in the size of the parameter & When
== 0,then q =6rand ffi =qin (2). This allows output to be controlled
directly, as in Sachs (1983). It is also assumed that 0 =0in (8). Since
=—y,the system in this case reduces to one state-variable:
(ii)
where A =(1—A)/28
The Hamiltonian for the Nash non-cooperative solution is:
H = (12)
where ir(1 _A)y+Ay* andis the shadow price of domestic inflation.
From the canonical equation for the costate variable and the first order
condition for a maximum, we obtain a differential equation for the control
variable:
q = _A)y* (13)
Ignoring foreign inflation, (11) and (12) give a system with two roots
(R) of opposite sign (and equal magnitude when /?= 0):
2R =fl±[(Ii+2A)2+4(1 (14)
The cooperative solution is obtained by setting r =0so that ir =y=
This is equivalent to making A =0in (11) and The stable root is
larger in this case so that, as we found in the steady-state example, there
is less of a contractionary bias under cooperation. The more efficient timing
of inflation implies also a lower loss in this case. However, in the two-country
world, it is not possible to rank policies because the open-loop is no longer
first best. Indeed, even among time consistent policies, there is no
presumption in favor of cooperation which may be as overinflationary as
the open-loop non-cooperative is overdeflationary. This is, of course, one
of the basic insights drawn from early (but as yet largely unpublished)
contributions by Canzoneri and Gray (1983), Eichengreen (1984), Cooper
(1984), Rogoff (1983), Laskar (1984) and others.9
One is left hoping that a forthcoming Oudiz—Sachs paper will consolidate
the gains in insight by providing empirical evidence on the gains from (time
consistent?) policy coordination in a multicountry model.
NOTES
IThere are many references in this literature, which in a sense goes back to
project LINK. Aside from the Brookingspaper,the asymmetry between the
- -
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Ld U.S. and other industrial countries or groups thereof is analyzed in Brandsma
.n and Hallett (1983) and Hallett (1984). There is also the exciting work of Taylor,
say his (1984). Another deleted strand of literature assesses attitudes toward
cooperation. See Axelrod (1984) and the survey of policy makers reported in
Deane and Pringle (1984).
2 Solving the two-country IS model, we would obtain:
I) q =8r_cr(i_1r)_o.*(i*_ir*)
qt =_8r*_o.(i*_ir*)_o.(i_m)
• Note that the consumer price indices are used to deflate interest rates, so
that
2) q_q* =26r+(o._o.*)(l_A_A*)
0 It can be shown that a> If 1 —A =A*the effect disappears. The expected
negative effect stems from the transfer condition: A+ A* >1 if the exchange rate
er does not enter, the coefficient becomes _(a_a*). See Macedo (1983a).
•ol 3 The LM curve would become
rn_pc=
•3) Using the definition of the consumer price index, we get the right hand side
of (2) as a cz-weighted average of q and (1 —A)r. The real exchange rate effect
S drops when=I.See, for example, Macedo (1984).
4 This example, as discussed in Cooper (1982), may be counted as the first paper
4\ of Sachs on the subject. It represents a tutorial exposition of the beggar-
/ thy-neighborworld of Canzoneri and Gray (1981). Along the same lines, Sachs
(1983) includes a traded intermediate input with weight aanda real price (s)
fixed in terms of a basket with weightso that, if pV is the price of domestic
value added, the consumer price index is given by:
rig
pc= —a)s+O.5A(l —a)p+O.5(l —A)(l_a)(p*+e)
ry 5 This is shown in Macedo (1984).
er 6 This is elaborated in Macedo (1983a and b). See also Rogoff (1983).
7 On reputation equilibria, see Backus and Drifill (l984a and b). A good survey
as of differential games is in Tirole (1982).
8 This requires either that foreign prices do not enter the consumer price index
ie (A =1)or that 8 be infinite. As mentioned, the implied trade elasticities would
d) be implausible in a two-country model. In the first case, there would be no
er relevant link between the two economies.
9 The classic contributions are Johnson on tariffs and retaliation, Niehans and
te Hamada, who dealt lastly with fiscal interdependence in a Diamond debt setup;
see his (1984). In a sense, it all began with Hamada's application of game-theory
LW to the choice of the savings ratio in a two-country model of capital move-
ments; see his (1965, 98—113). Cooper (one of his thesis advisers) and his
classmate Bryant were encouraging. The field remained dormant for many
years, until well after Bryant (1980). Thanks largely to the Sachs machine, it
began to arouse attention in 1983.
to
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COMMENT KENNETH ROGOFF*
Z In this remarkably clear-headed paper, Glues Oudiz and Jeff Sachs have
succeeded in both consolidating and extending the more technical game-
theoretic literature on international monetary policy cooperation. One
important contribution of their paper is to provide relatively simple
examples of some difficult dynamic game theory concepts in the context
of a well-known international macro model. My specific comments on the
paper will deal with the question, raised here and in my 1983 paper, as
to whether cooperation between central banks exacerbates or ameliorates
the credibility problem of the central banks vis-à-vis the private sector. But
L. I will also make some general remarks about applications of game theory
)fl to international macroeconomics.
Until recently, the literature on international monetary cooperation
focused almost exclusively on the strategic interactions of sovereign central
-ce banks, each concerned solely with its own country's welfare. Because little
• attention was paid to the problem of maintaining low time-consistent rates
tic of inflation, the strong presumption was that cooperation beween central
banks in stabilization policy is unambiguously beneficial. In Rogoff
(l983b), I formally demonstrated that this presumption was incorrect. In
the absence of institutional constraints on systematic inflation, a cooperative
Id regime may quite possibly be characterized by higher mean inflation rates
ry than a noncooperative regime. Suppose, for example, that private agents
are concerned that the central bank will try to exploit the existence of
or nominal wage contracts to raise employment. Wage setters can frustrate
the central bank by setting wage inflation high enough so that in the
al absence of disturbances, the central bank will choose to ratify wage setters'
rt. targetreal wage. At a high enough rate of inflation, the central bank finds
that the marginal gain from trying to lower employment below wage
ry setters' target level is offset by the marginal loss from still higher inflation.
Consider how this inflationary bias may be exacerbated in a cooperative
regime. When central banks inflate jointly, none of them need worry about
having their real exchange rate depreciate. On the other hand, in a
noncooperative regime, real depreciation provides an important check on
ft. each central bank's incentive to unanticipatedly expand its money supply,
since depreciation lowers the employment gains and raises the inflation
S. costs. Because cooperation removes this check on the central banks'
incentives to inflate, it raises the time-consistent level of nominal wage
inflation. This basic result can be extended to alternative non-neutralities
•nt and alternative sources of time-consistency problems. Depending on the
central banks' objective functions, it is also possible that the cooperative328 Comment by Kenneth Rogoff
regime will be characterized by lower inflation. (The cooperative regime re
may have lower time-consistent inflation rates if (a) the central banks'
WI
objective functions depend on employment and money supply growth (as
in Canzoneri—Gray (1984)) rather than employment and inflation, and (b)
the coefficients of the macro model are such that an unanticipated foreign
monetary expansion lowers employment at home.) Note also that in all ti
cases, cooperation produces superior responses to disturbances. B
Oudiz and Sachs have produced an example in which cooperation
actually removes the source of the time-consistency problem, and is
unambiguously welfare-improving. Their analysis seems particularly a 1
relevant to the disinflation problems faced by many countries over the past
ten years. In the Oudiz—Sachs model, time-consistency problems arise
because if a government unilaterally announces future right monetary a
policies, it causes its exchange rate to appreciate today thereby improving w
itscurrent-period Phillips curve trade-off. Since future governments will
not be concerned with how expectations of their policies affect today's h
exchange rate, the optimal unilateral policy will not be time-consistent. th
Cooperation ensures that central banks will not try to manipulate the o
exchange rate to their advantage and therefore removes this source of time o
inconsistency. Note that there is no long-run systematic inflationary bias ra
in Oudiz and Sachs' model. En passant, it is worth mentioning that e
time-consistency problems can arise through a similar channel as in the p
Oudiz—Sachs paper in a closed-economy model in which both the price level
and the real interest rate enter the central bank's objective function.
I want to conclude with a few general remarks on the game theory N
approach to international macroeconomics embodied in many of the
papers in this conference. One issue is whether or not it is realistic to
the game between countries in monetary policy separately from the games
involved in setting trade policy, defense policy, etc. There are certainly
cases where countries tie commercial relations to defense relations: And
it is also not unusual for countries to simultaneously negotiate over trade
and monetary issues. The problem becomes especially acute when we R1
consider some of the dynamic concepts introduced by Oudiz and Sachs.
Consider reputational equilibria, for example. If a country has recently I
misbehavedin trade policy, might that not affect its credibility in monetary
policy? Secondly, I commend Oudiz and Sachs for reminding us in their
interesting theoretical paper, that an important goal of this research should
be its ultimate application. In fact, Oudiz and Sachs' (l984a) Brookings
paper is one of the very few empirical papers in this literature. Matthew o
Canzonerihas stressed in his comments here that empirical implementation
appears difficult even for the Canzoneri—Gray (1984) model. In that RInternational coordination in dynamic macroeconomics 329
e relatively simple model, one can deduce quite a lot simply by knowing
whether an unanticipated foreign money increase raises or lowers domestic
employment. Unfortunately, Canzoneri points out, the empirical evidence
on the sign of this effectis not decisive. In models with multiple
I instruments,and in which foreign policy affects multiple domestic objec-
tives, the problem is even harder. For then, as in Oudiz and Sachs'
Brookings paper, we need to know the magnitudes of all the multipliers,
and not just their signs. It is also clear from analyses such as the present
is Oudiz—Sachs paper, that empirical implementation requires knowing quite
a bit about the strategic behavior of the central banks. What type of game
they are playing and with whom: the other country's central bank, their
—se own private sector and/or their own fiscal authorities? Clearly, it will be
•ry a challenge to embody the new game-theoretic approach in future empirical
work.
ill Finally, we should recognize that game theory leads to thinking about
how to modify institutions rather than policies. Hamada (1976) stressed
• that the problem of international monetary cooperation is best viewed as
he one in which countries cooperate to set up the system which works best
ne on a day-to-day basis without cooperation. The new focus on institutions
as rather than just policies is a logical extension of the early work on rational
expectations, which emphasized the importance of analyzing systematic





*Theviews expressed here are those of the author and should not be interpreted





Canzoneri, Matthew B. and Jø Anna Gray (1984). 'Monetary policy games and
Ely the consequences of non-cooperative behavior'. InternationalEconomic
Lry Review,forthcoming.
eir Hamada, Koichi (1976). 'A strategic analysis of monetary interdependence'.
ild Journalof Political Economy 84,Aug., 667—700.
Oudiz, Gilles and Jeffrey Sachs (l984a). 'Macroeconomic policy coordination g among the industrial economies'. Brookingpapers on economic activity1, 1—64.
ew Oudiz, Gilles and Jeffrey Sachs (1984b). 'International policy coordination in
On dynamic macroeconomic models', this volume.
iat Rogoff, Kenneth (1983a). 'The optimal degree of commitment to an intermediate330 Comment by Kenneth Rogoff
monetary target: Inflation gains versus stabilization costs'. International
Finance Discussion Paper No. 230, Sept. (Board of Governors of the Federal
Reserve System, Washington, D.C.).
Rogoff, Kenneth (I 983b). 'Productive and counterproductivecooperative monetary
policies.' International Finance Discussion Paper No. 233, December (Board
of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Washington, D.C.).
I
T
m
evi
of
th
ol
In
di
to
sot
to
fo
of•